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corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced
out of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so
impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern
and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together, and
then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.
HYL. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the CREATION is the last objection I can think of;
and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be
overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.
PHIL. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the question, can this, think you, be
anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed
in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary
opinion, with men of a learned, education.
HYL. I confess it seems to be as you say.
PHIL. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great
advantages that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning.
The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved
with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an
obscure general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense
of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and
goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the
fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own
being. Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what
obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of the numberless
disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. do they not pretend to
explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able
to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in
reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from
one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able
to reach the MECHANICAL production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the
laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they
accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts
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Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, by George Berkeley (chapter3)
of the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an
All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the PHENOMENA are nothing
else but IDEAS; God is a SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate
an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order,
regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and
provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in
PHYSICS. Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a
negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him
immediately present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking
second causes. Then in METAPHYSICS: what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial
forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and accident, principle of individuation,
possibility of Matter s thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely
different as SPIRIT AND MATTER, should mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and
endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by
supposing only Spirits and ideas? Even the MATHEMATICS themselves, if we take away the
absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes
and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the. infinite divisibility of finite extension;
which depends on that supposition But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not
that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the
same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things,
or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to
consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change
of colours in a pigeon s neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have
weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external
originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable; however, not
changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and
truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the
IRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.
HYL. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your
opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a
mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what
fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of
IMMATERIALISM!
PHIL. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to
embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and
remote from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the ABSOLUTE
existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in
different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater
evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?
HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, what security can I have that I
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