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State of Tamaulipas about forty miles south of the Rio Grande.47 They conducted frequent raids
into Texas, stealing livestock, pilfering homes, and killing Americans. After one of the
Kickapoos more vicious raids in 1873, the 4th US Cavalry crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico at
night, assaulting the Kickapoo village. Forty plus Indians were killed and many taken prisoner.
The village burned to the ground, and the cavalry returned to US territory before Mexican militia
could respond.48 Mexico expressed extreme disapproval of this unauthorized use of US military
force on sovereign Mexican territory.
In the 1880s, a new threat caused Mexico and the United States to overlook their former
border problems and come to an agreement with respect to over-the-border use of force. As white
settlers progressively moved westward to establish new settlements and mines, the Apache who
had inhabited this region for countless years without interference, attacked. The Apache killed
Mexicans and Americans alike.49 In 1882, the US and Mexico came to an informal agreement,
allowing soldiers of either country to cross the international border in pursuit of hostile
Apaches.50 In Mexican areas terrorized by Apaches, American soldiers were hailed as heroes. The
agreement was renewed annually until another incident occurred.51 In 1886, Mexican militia
ambushed an expedition made up almost entirely of Indian scouts but led by a captain from the
3rd US Cavalry. The American captain was killed along with many of his party.52 Washington
determined more aggressive incursions were necessary. This, in turn, led to Mexican bitterness
and anger toward the US troops and a glorification of the local bandits who defied the foreign
military. This trend continued into the years of the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920, and led to
47
Congress, Senate, House Reports, 45 Cong., 2 sess., Misc. Doc. No. 64, Jan 12, 1873, 143.
48
Report of the Committee of Investigation sent in 1873 by the Mexican Government to the Frontier of
Texas, (New York, 1875), pp. 424-425.
49
Ibid., pp 241, 244-250.
50
Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy,
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), 5.
51
Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo, (New Haven, Conn.: 1929), pp 165-166.
52
Clendenen, 6.
25
the legendary status of Pancho Villa. To some, he was a Robin Hood. To others he was an
Attila.53
Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States during most of the revolution in
Mexico, himself, wavered between two perspectives of Villa. At one point, the revolutionary was
considered a possible future leader of Mexico, albeit not due to his popularity as a politician but
because he would be no worse than the other choices of revolutionary leaders. However, in 1915,
the United States officially recognized Venustiano Carranza as head of the Mexican de facto
government. In Washington s eye, Villa reverted from being a semi-respected politician to his
earlier status as bandit and outlaw, though now an extremely powerful one.54 Villa virtually
declared war against Carranza, and although he had no specific fight with the United States, he
emphatically stated that  a dozen nations (like the US) could not keep Carranza from failure. 55
Searching for a way to hurt Carranza, Villa placed his sights on the port city of Agua
Prieta opposite the American town of Douglas, Arizona. Agua Prieta, geographically separated
from Carranza s strongholds, was short on supplies, had insufficient defenses, and was
undermanned. It therefore presented a relatively soft target for a nighttime raid by Villa s bandits.
The United States, however, was now in the position of opposing Villa openly and could not
allow him a foothold so close to American interests. The United States assisted the defenders of
Agua Prieta with trainloads of US and Mexican reinforcements, artillery, munitions, and
equipment. Americans helped convert Agua Prieta from a small port city into an impregnable
fortress prior to Villa s attack.
Early morning on 1 November, Villa launched his assault. Agua Prieta s freshly built
defenses of interlaced trenches covered with barbed wire, defended by automatic machine guns,
53
Ibid., 11.
54
Ibid., 193.
55
Ibid., 207.
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